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THE SNITCH RULE: DOES IT WORK?
VIVIAN

E. BERG*

On December 19, 1988, the National Law Journal carried a
story on In re Himmel.1 The article was headlined, "Illinois Bar Is
Jarred by 'Snitch' Case," and the kicker inquired, "First of Its
Kind?" '2 The North Dakota Bar was, and is, jarred, also. With that
story, the phone in the Office of Disciplinary Counsel started ringing. A one-year suspension based on the violation of the duty to
report misconduct? And, get this, the client had reported. Had I
ever heard of such a thing in North Dakota?
Well, no. Not under Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 and not under the "old" DR 1-103(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.4 Not before Himmel and the North Dakota
State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Formal
Opinion 42,1 which affirmed the duty to report, and not after,
either. This is not to say that there has never been a complaint
based on the duty to report misconduct. Yet, I cannot recall any
time, no matter how egregious the misconduct, when there has
been the least bit of attention given to whether or not a file should
be opened to inquire into whether a lawyer had the requisite
knowledge under Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
possible misconduct that should be considered by the Disciplinary
Board.
However, attention is given, and utmost professional soulsearching prompted by Himmel and Opinion 42, by the individual
lawyer who must make the call on whether or not to file a given
complaint. At least one question a week is referred by the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel to the State Bar Association of North
Dakota Ethics Committee for help with that decision.
The conversations regarding those questions sound like class
discussions of the amicus curiaebriefs filed in support of Himmel's
* J.D., School of Law, University of North Dakota, 1979; Staff Counsel, Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court and Judicial Conduct Commission, 1982 to present. Opinions
expressed are her own and not necessarily those of either the Disciplinary Board or Judicial
Conduct Commission or individual members.
1. 125 Ill. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
2. Illinois Bar Is Jarred by 'Snitch' Case, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 3.
3. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.3 (1988) (North Dakota adopted the
Rules of Professional Conduct effective January 1, 1988, replacing the Code of Professional
Responsibility).
4. N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1986).
5. State Bar Association of North Dakota (SBAND) Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 42 (1990).
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petition for rehearing. 6 For starters, do we really want duplicate
filings if a lawyer knows, as Himmel did, that a complaint regarding the conduct has already been lodged? But the primary and
more difficult concern is the impact that an enforced duty to file
can have on privilege and confidentiality. Does the client who
brings along a relative to provide moral support or help with lawyer consultation unwittingly destroy the privilege? Is confidentiality lost because of a supervening duty to report, if the problems
presented by the client reveal an area of lawyer misconduct?
Does the duty outweigh zealous advocacy as well?
One can barely sketch the parameters, although the language
of Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct directed to the
lawyer having knowledge of conduct that raises a substantialquestion as to honesty, trustworthiness and fitness of a lawyer or judge
may be read to mandate reporting of serious misconduct only.
There is the situation in which a lawyer settling a client's claims
against another lawyer for "lawyer theft" or malpractice is fearful,
suspicious, or concerned (choose the word-the one we are avoiding is knows) that there is misconduct relating to the source of the
settlement funds. There is no question that lawyer theft frequently leads to discipline, and one can be comfortable with a duty
to report such misconduct.
But there is also the situation in which a lawyer has exhibited
incompetence, in violation of Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.7 The fact is that incompetency issues, unless they can be
defined as neglect, are not often reached through discipline.
Many lawyers can tell about cases in which opposing counsel, deficient by almost any measure, nevertheless prevailed. Filing a
complaint may seem like sour grapes or harassment after losing a
case. Moreover, and here's the rub, if it is unlikely that a disciplinary order would be entered based on the incompetence, it follows that a disciplinary case could not possibly be premised on
failure to report.
There has been a growing number of sanction orders entered
6. The following amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of Himmel's petition for
rehearing:
Illinois Attorneys for Criminal Justice in Support of Petitioner on Rehearing.
Brief of Tau Epsilon Rho Law Society, and Its Chicago Graduate Chapter,
Amicus Curiae.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Illinois State Bar Association.
The petition for rehearing was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court on January 30,
1989. Himmel, 125 I11.2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 790.
7. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1990).
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under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 They
address competency issues but, contrary to my prediction of several years ago, they have not signaled a comparable focus on competency issues within disciplinary agencies. This is also true of
malpractice cases against lawyers, which have increased and seem
to me to be moving beyond competency and neglect to issues
more traditionally ethical, such as conflict of interest. Sometimes I
read malpractice cases in which a hefty judgment is entered
against the lawyer and think that there would be low-level or no
discipline if the same facts were presented for professional discipline. If there is a cutting edge, it is Rule 11 and malpractice, not
their counterparts in the Rules of Professional Conduct, that are
on it.
There is a further problem with the snitch rule which runs so
deep that it is surprising that anyone actually expects the rule to
work. That problem is the way in which reporting-turning someone in-runs against the grain. Competency, safekeeping client
funds, and avoiding conflicts of interest are good professional tenets, but snitching? It is an alien norm, and adherence to its
precepts makes us profoundly uncomfortable.
Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Himmel, and
Opinion 42 may offer some comfort to the lawyer who decides to
report misconduct. And they do report, although not in great
numbers, and certainly not enough, in my opinion, to have a substantial impact on the way lawyers or judges do business. Even if
they are personally at peace with reporting, lawyers worry that
they will be branded unfavorably within the collegial ranks of the
profession. Ask a lawyer how he or she feels about reporting judicial misconduct and see if the answer includes "professional suicide," a fate far from what anyone would-or should have tocontemplate within allegiance to an ethical code.
Even if caseload and staffing were the only considerations, it
would be hard to advocate that a disciplinary system, already so
8. Rule 11 provides as follows:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose ... an appropriate sanction ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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reliant upon volunteer work, should expend resources pursuing
not lawyer misconduct, but what other lawyers knew and when
they knew it. But it is clear to me that institutional progress is
necessary before we can reasonably expect the "duty to report" to
provide significant support for maintaining high professional
standards.

